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Madrassa Reforms under Pervez Musharraf: Policy, Implementation and Challenges (1999-2008)

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Abstract

The Musharraf administration-initiated madrassa reform on August 18, 2001, shortly before the transformative events of 9/11, which profoundly affected global affairs. Faced with heightened international pressure, especially from the Bush administration, Pervez Musharraf was obliged to align Pakistan with the war on terror, thereby complicating the government's educational reform agenda. A central element of this reform was the establishment of the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board, intended to incorporate madrassas into the national educational system. Nevertheless, these initiatives encountered strong resistance from the Ulama, who feared that madrassa autonomy would be undermined. Their concerns focused on three main points: first, that government officials should refrain from intervening in Madrassa internal affairs; second, that any changes to the traditional curriculum should be avoided to preserve established educational practices; and third, that the creation of Deni Madaris under government auspices could result in undue state control over madrassa content and operations. Despite assurances from the Musharraf administration that these fears were unfounded, the Ulama remained suspicious, particularly regarding the possibility that future governments might impose more intrusive measures. Consequently, the reform process was marked by a dynamic tension between governmental objectives and the entrenched interests of religious scholars, underscoring the complexities of educational reform within a highly politicized environment.

Keywords: Education; Madrassa; Musharraf's Policy; War on Terror; 9/11

1. Introduction

This paper evaluates Pervez Musharraf's interactions with the Madrassas. The basic education system for learning and teaching began from the very beginning, if we trace it back to the Prophet's times. And then it went on from the Caliphate, the Umayyads and then the Abbasid empire. Looking into, post-independence Ayyub Khan initiated the Madrassa reforms, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Zia ul Haq and then Pervez Musharraf. Before discussing Musharraf, we may examine Zia ul Haq's time, madrassas.

role, and their responses. The front-line war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. This time again, due to our strategic position, we were at war. Pre 9/11, one must understand the circumstances that Pakistan was one of the few countries that had accepted the Taliban government. Now we were motivated to fight against them due to the 9/11 attacks. Having an alliance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Pakistan supported the U.S. Musharraf took some bold steps in this regard, including the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board Ordinance and the Madrassa Reform Projects of 2002, 2003, and 2007. These madrassas changed their activities, and laws were formed. If President Musharraf precisely followed them, he could get his desired goals.

Furthermore, his enlightened moderation was a smart move that further expounds his push for the country's modernization. The strategy was not one-way; it was two-way. Islam rejects terrorism and extremism and promotes socio-economic development. It was the West and the U.S. that must solve the political disputes. "The first part is for the Muslim world to shun militancy and extremism and adopt the path of socio-economic uplift. The subsequent part is for the West and the US to look to determine all political debates with equity and to help in the financial improvement of the denied Muslim world" (Amin & Lodhi, 2015). President Musharraf claimed that enlightened moderation will eradicate religious fundamentalism from Pakistani society and bring modernity to the country. Musharraf's Enlightened Moderation program has also been acknowledged by the West since the 9/11 incident (Amin & Lodhi, 2015). Moreover, Musharraf wanted a favour from the people of Pakistan, so through enlightened moderation, he thought, he might gain public attention. He gets public support from secular society for the military government.

2. Pakistan Madrassa Education Board (PMEB) Ordinance, 2001

The Ministry of Education established a committee under the chairmanship of S. M Zaman in 1998. Under the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board Ordinance, a curriculum and a board system were introduced to bring changes to madrassas. This was the brainchild of that committee. In this regard, three madrassas were built in Karachi, Sukkur, and Islamabad, two for boys and one for girls (Sajjad, 2013). The Musharraf administration wanted to achieve the desired goals through this ordinance. Unfortunately, he failed to reform the madrassa projects. Musharraf's focus behind these reforms was to bring madrassas into the mainstream. He also wanted to stop international students from enrolling in madrassas. The purpose of the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board (PMEB) was to bring the two educational systems into equity based on both educational degrees (Sajjad, 2013). The Ministry of Religious Affairs controlled the PMEB, and the board consisted of individuals from various schools of thought who worked with the PMEB. Due to the non-cooperative nature of religious institutions, the government failed to get the desired results.

The Musharraf administration-initiated madrassa reform one month before the 9/11 attacks on August 18, 2001; the primary purpose of the government was to bring madrassas into the mainstream. However, this incident altered the dynamics of the entire world. The Bush administration asked Musharraf to join the war against terrorism or face fate.

Ulama's reservations had also been concerning the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board. Looking into, Pakistan madrassa education board's goal was to bring changes to the outlook of madrassas, while Ulama reservations appeared as they felt a threat to their presence. These were the main concerns. Firstly, the Madrassa autonomy government officials did not interfere in the madrassa's internal issues. Secondly, the Ulama wanted no changes to the curricula of madrassas, as they would be taught as they had been earlier. The government should not force us to change the curriculum. Thirdly, they doubted that if the government established these Deni Madaris, it would be bound to form affiliations with boards, which they did not want (Lodhi, 2015). The government

assured that the President did not have such a thought in his mind, but they did not want to take the risk that future governments may follow previous policies.

3. Madrassa Reforms Project, August 2001, 2002 & 2007

Post 9/11, madrassa was branded as a factory of violence, and the international community branded Islam as a violent religion. The Madrassa reforms project post-9/11 had different connotations. Earlier, government concerns were different, but after 9/11, concerns changed. The Cabinet approved in June 2002 a draft law for registration of financial assistance to Madrassas. Under that law, madrassas were required to register with PMEB. On the other hand, they will be fined if they fail to register with PMEB.

Ulama's response to Musharraf's madrassa reforms project seems more serious as he brings back-to-back reforms toward madrassas. The U.S. funded \$100 million to the Madrassa under the Madrassa Reform Project (2002-03-2007) to bring curriculum changes. Ulama reservations on this issue because they believed they received money from the U.S. and worked for them (Amin & Lodhi, 2015). One thing that lacked most was trust between the seminaries and the state, as the seminaries did not trust state-led Madrassa reforms, and the same was true of the state's response to the seminaries, because they also did not trust them. Ulama said that we did not need government jobs and suggested that they would provide jobs to university students (Haqqani, 2010). Our students will serve in a madrassa and teach the Holy Quran and hadiths. The U.S. provided \$5.7 billion to the Musharraf administration to support the Madrassa reform project. However, in three years, only 514.5 million were utilized for Madrassa reforms. Now Musharraf had given a deadline to meet.

The basic thing lacking in both was a trust deficit between the government and the Ulama reservations on the madrassa. Pakistan's role in the War on Terror and the Ulama's mistrust toward the government's ties with the U.S (Haqqani, 2010). Small madrassas were willing to do so because, through this, they could gain some state favour, and through madrassa reform projects, they would get funds. The government's reservations related to the large madrassas were to maintain madrassa records, as well as other official data, which was lacking in small madrassas. The Ministry of Education had accepted the failure of the Madrassa reform project. "In the last five years, we reached out to only 507 madrasahs", (Haqqani, 2010), showed how state-led madrassa reform projects were initiated against the madrassa while the state was seriously taking action to work against them. Madrassa education could bring real changes if state-led reforms were taken to address some serious concerns and lay real groundwork.

4. Post 9/11 Western Approach Toward Madrassa

During Zia's government, both countries enjoyed warm and congenial relations. It was a time when the U.S. provided a \$3.2 billion aid package to Pakistan, making it the second-largest recipient of aid after Israel (Musharraf, 2006). This package was primarily used for the Afghanistan war against the Soviet Union army. On the contrary, the U.S. banned economic as well as military aid to Pakistan on account of nuclear proliferation in 1998 (Jalal, 2014). Al-Qaeda had attacked the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. This incident changed the world scenario; almost the world was on the same page against terrorism. The U.S. asked Pervez Musharraf, "Are you either with us or against us?". At that time, Pakistan's DG ISI was also in the U.S. when these attacks were held in America; the same message was conveyed to DG ISI. Musharraf accepted the U.S. demand and brought all of Pakistan into the War on Terror. Musharraf quickly accepted their seven demands without compromising. Being an ally of the US, Pervez Musharraf backed the setup from his neighbour Afghanistan, whose government he accepted.

Pervez Musharraf, in his memoir, said we had given 689 terrorists to the U.S. Some were known to the world, some were unknown to the world, and he handed over 389 to the U.S, although no big names were in them. There are many reasons why the U.S. has forced Pakistan to do more than other South Asian Countries. Among them, the foremost tangible reason is Pakistan's geostrategic importance. Pakistan assists NATO in the battle in Afghanistan. That is why, post 9/11, Washington kept on depending on Pakistan to uncover Al-Qaeda terror bases and oppressors who were suspected to work inside the Pak-Afghan boundary (Musharraf, 2006). The U.S. started military operations in Afghanistan in late 2001. Then, Pakistan also became a strong ally of the U.S. In this respect, Pakistan talked with the Taliban's envoy to hand over Osama to the U.S. However, when negotiations failed, the U.S. vowed to retaliate horribly.

Pakistan allowed American allied forces to use its military bases for launching attacks on Afghan soil. Additionally, Pakistan provided the U.S. airbases in Jacobabad, Pasni, Shamsi, and Dalbandin military bases for technical assistance. This had been fully provided to the coalition with the Pakistani forces through Pakistan. In exchange for this, the U.S. provided \$1,766 million in economic and military assistance to Pakistan (Musharraf, 2006). On the other hand, through Pakistan, the U.S. started a full-fledged war against AL-Qaeda. But its impacts went beyond the Afghan border. Pakistan also suffered due to the War on Terror because AL-Qaeda retaliated against Pakistan instead of the U.S. Many men of letters have still criticized Pakistan's policy on the War on Terror because of its drift towards terrorism in Pakistan. It was an hour to assist the wounded beast (America). Furthermore, Pakistan has also lost thousands of people. Since September 2001, 21672 Civilians and 2795 Soldiers lost their lives in bomb blasts, including 283 suicide attacks, and 8671 were injured in Pakistan (Fair, 2004).

The masses in Pakistan have never made adequate remarks about U.S. policies. There were frequent drone attacks on Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The Phustoon-populated FATA remained the home for the Taliban (Wang, 2010), due to the U.S greater involvement in Pakistan's internal issues. According to a report, 60% of Pakistanis consider the U.S. an enemy of Pakistan (Akhtar, 2012). Being an Islamic state, its traditions, norms, ethics, cultures, and environment are completely in contrast to those of the U.S. Even though it is assumed in Pakistan that the U.S. is the sole opponent of Islam.

On the other hand, the Salalah incident added fuel to the fire on November 26, 2011. Twenty-four Pakistan soldiers were killed in this attack (Akhtar, 2012). Resultantly, a large chunk of the population took to the road and strongly protested the mayhem attitude of the U.S towards the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

5. Post 9/11 Regional Response to Madrassa

Although Afghanistan shares a typical religion, race, history, nationality, and geology with Pakistan, the relations between the two have never been smooth. The idea of Pak-Afghan relations has been hindered numerous times in the past. The relationship between the two neighbours could be described as challenging and complex. Because earlier Pakistan sponsored madrassa seminaries on Afghan soil, while after 9/11 it changed; yesterday's friend became today's enemy. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was an enormous threat not only to Pakistan but also to the Persian Gulf countries in terms of geostrategic location. Hence, America was involved in this conflict indirectly through Pakistan to curb the Soviet front-line during the Cold War. So, Pakistan became a frontline State and fought this war. Madrassa students were engaged in the jihadi mindset to tackle the soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The point here is to note that it was decided by the men of letters that the next target of the Soviets would be Islamabad, hence Pakistan would accept the decision of America.

On the other hand, the Carter Administration authorized \$3.2 billion for a five-year military aid program for Pakistan (Kux, 2001). Then, Pakistani agencies played an active role in this war.

Besides, the United Nations' role in the quest for peace in South Asia is recognized to some extent. Because of the UN battle, the Geneva Accords were endorsed on April 14, 1988, by the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and the Secretary of State of the US (Jabeen et al., 2020). The agreements precluded both Afghanistan and Pakistan from mediating or meddling in internal issues. The limit issues would be addressed by an unbiased expression. "The two states should cease from the danger and withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan; the Afghan government indulged in civil war between groups. A large portion of the Afghan population had suffered during the Islamization of power so as not to disregard the limits of one another" (Musharraf, 2006). After the clash, this turmoil led to the emergence of the Taliban Government in Afghanistan. And Pakistan was one of the three countries that recognized the Taliban government in Afghanistan (Jabeen et al., 2020).

The terrorist assaults of September 11, 2001, changed worldwide history and put the world under a new chapter of the war on terror. As previously mentioned, Al-Qaeda asserted the assaults, and it was based in Afghanistan. Consequently, America turned towards Pakistan since Afghanistan was a doorstep neighbour. Pakistan supported the U.S. since Washington clarified that illegal intimidation was a danger and impartiality would not be an alternative. Indeed, even at the top of the Pakistani State, Parvez Musharraf said, "We remained with the United States, and we remain with the whole world, in restricting psychological oppression. However, we face dangers from the inside and without" (Jabeen et al., 2020). Hence, with the collaboration of Pakistan, the U.S. attacked Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. The U.S. invaded Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. Therefore, the Taliban's political powers were dispensed with by making space for a breakaway government. After the destruction of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, the United Nations masterminded the gathering of chosen Tribal Chiefs in Bonn (Germany), and the force was moved from the Northern Alliance to the breakaway government (Jabeen et al., 2010). This arrangement recognized the privilege of individuals in Afghanistan to unreservedly decide their own political future. Later, in elections, Hamid Karzai was chosen as the Head of State. Curiously, the Monarchy's political rule ended obviously.

Besides, President Musharraf visited Afghanistan in April 2002 and announced \$100 million in aid for its reconstruction (Jabeen et al., 2010). President Musharraf was the first Head of State to visit Afghanistan after the effective fruition of the official political race. In the same year, Musharraf's partner Hamid Karzai paid a visit to Pakistan. This visit brought forth great cordial relations. On the other hand, Pakistan offered a wide range of goods, political, and financial help to fortify the new government in Kabul under Hamid Karzai. Pakistan additionally offered full support for the quiet lead of official races in October 2004. In this respect, Pakistan sealed its border to guard against any invasion aimed at disrupting the election process (Kardousd & Javaid, 2017). Later, it was the same Karzai who blamed Pakistan for sabotaging the conditions of the regions. On the contrary, although Pakistan provided bases to the US to attack militants in Afghanistan, Pakistan played an adequate role in promoting peace. For instance, George Tenet, former CIA head, acknowledged Pakistan's efforts in the quest for peace in the region (Choudhary, 1968). Later, Zardari's government, relations between the countries seemed friendly. In January 2009, President Asif made an official visit to Afghanistan. And it was decided by both countries to combat terrorism.

Furthermore, in September 2010, Karzai visited Pakistan, and a treaty was signed to enhance trade cooperation between the two countries. This treaty is popularly known as the Transit Trade

Agreement. Apart from bilateral relations, Pakistan and Afghanistan have not resolved the issue of the Durand Line. That is why their relations have always been in hot water.

The relationship improved particularly when Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee travelled to Lahore to meet Sharif in February 1999. There was significant expectation that the gathering could prompt a forward leap. They marked the Lahore accord promising again to "escalate their endeavours to determine all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir" (Pande, 2011). Tragically, in May 1999, India dispatched airstrikes against Pakistani-sponsored forces that had invaded the mountains in Indian-administrated Kashmir, North of Kargil. Pakistan reacted by occupying positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control in the far-off, hilly region of Kashmir close to Kargil, undermining the capacity of India to supply its forces on Siachen Glacier. By late spring, genuine battling erupted in the Kargil area. The infiltrators pulled out after a gathering between Prime Minister Sharif and President Bill Clinton in July. Relations between India and Pakistan have been especially strained, particularly since October 12, 1999, due to the unrest in Islamabad.

Pressure along the truce line proceeded, and the most exceedingly awful fighting for over a year broke out in October as India, which kept on denouncing Pakistan for cross-border psychological warfare, began shelling Pakistani military positions. October saw an overwhelming assault on the Kashmiri gathering in Srinagar, wherein 38 individuals were executed. After the assault, the Chief Minister of Indian-administrated Kashmir, Farooque Abdullah, approached the Indian government to dispatch a battle against the aggressor instructional courses across the line in Pakistan. On December 13, a fierce assault on the Indian Parliament in Delhi left 14 individuals dead. India again accused Pakistani-supported Kashmiri aggressors. The assault prompted a sensational development of troops along the Indo-Pakistan line, military trades, and raised feelings of dread of a more extensive clash. Rail and transport administrations between the two nations were likewise impeded.

Furthermore, a loosening of pressing factors began in 2003 when the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee held talks with Pakistan. Rail and transport organization between the two countries proceeded, and both countries assented to a détente in Kashmir. Moreover, the twelfth SAARC Summit was held in Islamabad in January 2004. At this event, President Musharraf met Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee on January 5, 2004. In these culmination talks, India and Pakistan continued extensive conversations with a plan that incorporated the Kashmir issue, confidence-building measures, and approaches to give protection from psychological warfare (Pande, 2011). These thorough interviews have consistently developed trust, brought arrangements to proceed with the suspension of atomic tests, to give earlier warning of missile tests, and to look for a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue. On June 20, 2004, the two nations marked the No War Pact and consented to expand an atomic testing boycott and to set up a hotline between their foreign secretaries aimed toward forestalling errors that may prompt a nuclear war (Pande, 2011).

In April 2005, President Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed to new confidence-building measures between the two countries. Their discussions, held during Musharraf's informal visit to India on April 17, delivered an arrangement, for instance, on the entry of trucks for business purposes over Kashmir's Line of Control, or truce line. This is required to help ease strains between nations. The improvement of relations between India and Pakistan includes questionable factors, i.e, the activities of Islamic radicals, yet endeavours ought to be made so that the line of point can fill in as an ideal tailwind for quickening the thaw between the two countries. In 2008, the political situation changed. Notwithstanding, Musharraf's standard has been finished, and PPP accepted the force of the state apparatus. In any case, it was an enormous misfortune for the two nations, which planned to determine the Kashmir issue through the secondary passage channel. Yet, lamentably, Musharraf lost their authority because of two occasions at the death of Benazir Bhutto

and the Lal Masjid activity. President Asif Ali Zardari additionally endeavours to create harmony between the two nations and resolve all issues of India and Pakistan; however, unexpectedly, a new episode, which was a Mumbai assault, has consequently reduced harmony talks.

Pervez Hoodbhoy elaborates on the changes brought by the enlightened moderation project. In this way, he conveyed his positivity toward modern society. Musharraf took bold steps that the earlier president Zia ul Haq did not; he initiated diverse actions before. In 2006, Musharraf called the Council of Islamic Ideology to work together on the Hudood ordinance-- after Zia, no one dared to act against this ordinance (Hoodbhoy, 2023).

6. Lal Masjid Incident

In July 2007, hundreds of highly trained SSG commandos carried out an operation silence against the Maulana Rasheed Gazni, a pro-Taliban fanatic (Mir, 2010). The operation ended with the deaths of hundreds of common people, military soldiers, and terrorists. The aftermath of the Lal Masjid incident was that suicide bombings increased in the country (Mir, 2010). The background story behind this episode was the Hafsa Women's Madrassa, which the Capital Development Authority (CDA) wanted to demolish, and they claimed it was illegally constructed on the land of the CDA (Musharraf, 2006). However, there are many Pakistanis who insist that the whole episode was stage-managed to boost Pervez Musharraf's sagging global image to the most trusted ally of the US in the War on Terror. However, Pervez Musharraf had been advocating verbally for enlightened moderation, which caused him criticism from religious extremists for this idea. A former university fellow, Rashid Ghazi, thought about co-education.

“The government ought to annul coeducation. Quaid-e-Azam University has become a brothel. It's female educators and students who wander in frightful dresses. They should cover up in a hijab, else they will be rebuffed by Islam.... Our female students have not been exposed to the danger of tossing corrosive on the revealed appearances of ladies. Be that as it may, such a danger could be utilized to create fear of Islam among wicked ladies. There is no mischief in it. There are undeniably more unpleasant disciplines in the Hereafter for such ladies” (Jabeen et al., 2020).

7. War on Terror

“War on Terror policies at home and abroad collectively punish Muslims for the 9/11 attacks” (Grewal, 2014). A wise person said, “As you sow, so shall you reap”. The War on Terror brought the situation for the US and Pakistan. This proverb describes the critical situation of Pakistan after drifting into the War on Terror. It is mentioned that the War on Terror had left severe impacts on Pakistan. Initially, Pakistan, along with the US, mobilized its forces on the soil of Afghanistan to curb the Taliban's network. But after this war, Pakistan suffered more than Afghanistan. Increasing religious organization's militancy has remained a great concern and menace for Pakistan.

Since 9/11, the number of attacks and violence in Pakistan has increased. It was estimated that 59 suicide bombings were reported in Pakistan in 2008 (Grewal, 2014). Such catastrophic figures showed that it was the wrong decision to join other wars. But no one can be visionary, especially in foreign policy decision-making.

During the War on Terror, many militants fled to Pakistan. Then the US launched drone attacks on Pakistan's land, which further deteriorated the relations between Pakistan and the US. Since August 2007, in 30 drone attacks, 263 people have been killed, including militants (Hussain, 2010). It means the state of Pakistan equally bore the cruelty of the US, the record of people injured and killed. Furthermore, Pakistan's role was dubious in this regard. On the one side, it condemned vehemently, but on the other side, Pakistan permitted the US to use its airbases, such as Jacobabad, to

operate drones. It means Pakistan applied a double-standard policy with its people. The establishment has always remained loyal to the US.

The prime objective behind the War on Terror was the exemplary persecution of Osama Bin Laden. In this regard, American agencies stretched their networks to the entire world. Additionally, due to massive clashes between Al-Qaeda and American allied forces in Afghanistan, many terrorists fled to neighbouring countries. Later, the CIA found Osama's residence in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Resultantly, they planned an operation against Osama bin Laden. Hence, on the night of May 1, 2011, American Air Jets entered Abbottabad and killed Osama bin Laden (Neumann & Smith, 2005). But this incident weakened the relations between the countries. Even the White House declared that this operation was carried out without consulting Pakistani forces (Neumann & Smith, 2005). It means the killing of Laden would sabotage the credibility of Pakistan on the global stage. It was not the first time that Pakistan fought another war, but every time, we forgot the causes and their effects, which in response brought to Pakistan's society socially, economically, and every time we drove into the war, which further demanded that we do more.

8. Role of Militant Organizations

President Musharraf faced pressure from the Western world to crack down on militant organizations that supported the terrorists directly or indirectly the terrorists. The President gave a detailed account of this and defined these organizations' roles. Jamaat Islami and Jamiat-Ulama Islam, these mainstream religiopolitical parties, had been involved in violence and militancy (Lodhi, 2011). In 2004, the CIA reported that Pervez Musharraf was playing a double game with the US on the War on Terror. Pervez Musharraf did not catch militants such as JeM, LeT and SSP. These militant organizations were working under another name in the country, and you did not hand over any big terrorists. Being our ally in countering the militant organization.

Insurgency in Baluchistan also increased during Musharraf's government. The Bugti tribal head, Sardar Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, has traditionally been regarded as loyal to the state. He remained the governor of Baluchistan and the Chief Minister of Baluchistan. He is also having a party to support his Bugti tribe, Jamhoori Watan Party. The rape of Dr Shazia Khalid was a turning point from pro-state to anti-state of Akbar Bugti. Akbar Bugti asked Pervez Musharraf to hand over the army officer who assaulted Dr Shazia, but Musharraf denied it, and conflict arose between them. The rape occurred at the Pakistan Petroleum Plant in Sui. It was the Nawab Akbar Bugti's attack on our honoured guest. Akbar Bugti attacked a gas pipeline in Sui and fled from his home at Dera Bugti. He was traced back by his phone, and Musharraf launched an operation against him in which F-16 and helicopters were used to kill him near his home, Tarnai-Kohlu Bugti, and his 38 followers died in this operation (Jalal, 2014). After the death of Akbar Bugti, a traditional shift transferred from the Bugti tribe to the Marri tribe. The Marri tribal areas became the centre of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), supported financially and morally. The Marri tribe attacked FC camps and military camps frequently. Musharraf banned BLA as a militant group when attacks were held more in 2006-7.

9. Tussle with the Judiciary

Pervez Musharraf suspended Chief Justice Iftikhar Ahmed Choudhary in March 2007 under the allegation of misconduct and nepotism (Musharraf, 2006). Pervez Musharraf feared that he might be a hurdle for me in the presidential re-election; this way, he removed himself. Pervez Musharraf's intentions seriously backfired, and lawyers started to protest him (Musharraf, 2006). They used the famous slogan to Go Pervez Musharraf Go, like these, as well as others, to remove him from power.

The US pressured Musharraf to give powers to the civil government, so he gave NRO to political workers and leaders to come back and do politics in the country.

Musharraf approached Benazir Bhutto for a coalition government, as he said you made me president, and your party would win the elections, but Benazir did not accept his offer. Pervez Musharraf did not approach Nawaz Sharif, as he knew Nawaz Sharif would not help him to become the president of Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan on October 16, 2007, at Karachi airport. A suicide bomb attack welcomed her when she arrived home.

Pervez Musharraf declared a state of emergency on November 3, 2007. Which further defames him, as earlier his Lal Masjid incident had done. The Supreme Court had invalidated his recent re-election as president, and political parties also boycotted the indirect presidential selection process. He controlled the media, whom he had earlier given more freedom and had curtailed their voice, which was against him. Through the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA). An emergency in-country uplift on December 15, 2007, during the time of parliamentary elections. Pervez Musharraf stepped down from his military command on November 28, 2007, as the COAS, and again he took an oath as the president as a civilian.

President Pervez Musharraf imposed an emergency in the country in November 2007, expressing in these words, “activities of extremists and incidents of terrorist attacks” (Singh, 2009). Looking into this emergency, was the country in a condition to again go into crisis? Musharraf ordered the arrest of the political parties’ workers. His fear of losing power in his hands was the leading cause behind the November emergency. The November emergency brought serious stability questions, both internal and external. No one thinks of this type of instability in the country because things were going smoothly. Normalization toward democracy was also challenged, due to his greedy nature, and the November emergency results. Political parties’ leaders came back home who had earlier left the country. Benazir Bhutto raised questions regarding his two offices; she demanded that he immediately take off his uniform. Musharraf approached Benazir Bhutto when she was in the UAE. Musharraf wanted to form a coalition government with her. She rejected his offer. The tragic death of Benazir Bhutto at Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi, brought the country into a struggle to live or die. Her death created serious security issues as well as external concerns. But Pakistan is the country that tackles every uncertain condition smoothly. Such as, after Benazir Bhutto’s death, three months later, general elections were held. In which her party won the most seats. This was the first time that a democratic government had ruled for five years. However, those five years were challenging for the Pakistani people.

10. Conclusion

President Pervez Musharraf’s work on madrassas could be appreciated, but something was lacking, such as cooperation and collaboration among them. Because trust in each other brought positive responses. Both lacked the Musharraf government, as well as seminaries, which never trusted Musharraf’s idea. Pakistan Madrassa Education Board outrightly rejects all five madrassa boards and Tanzeems. Musharraf set up three madrassas, and these madrassas could not produce any positive response due to their non-cooperative nature; they also survived. So, how do they think that the Madrassa board will join them and follow their curriculum? Musharraf could take further actions that may bring his trust to the Madrassa boards and seminaries. Still, the biggest question to answer is whether Musharraf’s intention was right or wrong. Because if we investigate events after his government, things will be very hard.

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